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Donald C. Dowling, Jr. *
Miami-based corporate mogul Victor Posner controls 47% of the
shares of DWG Corporation.' Among the few hundred largest U.S. cor-
porations, publicly-traded DWG is a holding company which owns
* Associate, Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio; Chair, American Bar Association
Subcommittee on European Community Employment Law (International Law Section). A.B., Uni-
versity of Chicago (1982); J.D., University of Florida (1985). The author thanks Nancy Hill Dow-
ling, Esq. (corporate counsel, Cincinnati) for her assistance. This article was completed in
December 1991.
1 See DeGeorge & Fina, The Posner Principle: When Goliath Controls the Company, Look Out,
Bus. WK., Oct. 29, 1990, at 34.
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Arby's, R.C. Cola, and a host of other businesses.2 Posner unyieldingly
exercises unrestrained power over those entities he effectively controls -
in the case of his 47% interest in DWG Corporation, Posner imposes a
"tyranny of the near-majority." 3 During DWG's fiscal year ending in
1990, according to news reports, DWG compensated Posner with $3.68
million in salary and benefits, plus $7.98 million more in "management
incentive" bonuses and another $6.6 million in rent paid to a Posner trust
at $10 per square foot over market rates.4 That year DWG itself lost
$11.53 million; its share price crashed from $16 to $4.25.'
Posner long evaded having to confront his unaligned co-sharehold-
ers directly. Between 1986 and October 1990, DWG Corporation never
held its "annual" shareholder meeting.6 When, under pressure from a
federal court, DWG finally did hold a perfunctory meeting on October
12, 1990, Posner's unaligned co-shareholders finally had a chance to ex-
press their feelings:
Within minutes [of the start of] ... Miami Beach-based DWG Corp.'s first
shareholders meeting since 1986... ,the sea of dark suits was hooting like
the cheap seats at Yankee Stadium:
"You've been doing it to shareholders for 20 years, Victor, keep it up."
"Where do you stand on your parole, Victor?"
"Are you going to continue to rape us?" 7
"Point of order," yelled one shareholder as the board considered a new
bonus plan for Posner and other managers. "This sucks." 8
Posner's control over DWG Corporation shows, rather dramati-
cally, how vital the exercise of corporate power is to any enterprise.
Many blame the U.S. recession of the early 1990s on injudicious exercises
of corporate control during the 1980s: So many corporations effectively
ceded power to financial advisors who engineered the borrowing of too
much money, often through issuing bonds, so that these companies could
exercise the ultimate power of taking over yet other corporations. 9 By
the 1990s, U.S. society blamed all sorts of social woes - including the
savings and loan crisis, corporate bond defaults, and the string of Wall
2 See Huber, Posner's Cool Deal Leaves Investors Cold, Miami Herald, Oct. 13, 1990, at IA, col.
1.
3 DeGeorge & Fina, supra note 1.
4 Id.; Huber, supra note 2.
5 Huber, supra note 2.
6 Id.; DeGeorge & Fina, supra note 1.
7 Huber, supra note 2.
8 DeGeorge & Fina, supra note 1.
9 For an excellent lay explanation of the 1980's rise and fall of the corporate bond market, see
M. LEwis, LIAR'S POKER 208-28 (1989).
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Street insider trading scandals - on the unrestrained exercise of corpo-
rate power."0 This blame-the-corporation attitude became pervasive.
One especially hyperbolical example appears as the blurb on a dust jacket
of a 1991 book on corporate "power and accountability":
Corporations determine far more than any other institution the air we
breathe, the quality of the water we drink, even where we live. Yet they are
not accountable to anyone.
The corporation has now become so powerful that it has outstripped the
limitations of accountability, becoming something of an externalizing
machine, in the same way a shark is a killing machine - no malevolence,
no intentional harm, just something designed with sublime efficiency for
self-preservation. And when companies are not held accountable for the
power they exercise, we all pay the price.11
Stateside critics tend to focus accusations of "corporate greed" on
U.S. corporations and on U.S. corporate tycoons;12 indeed, the U.S. may
be the world capital of corporate overreaching. But the United States is
by no means the only battleground for corporate power conflicts.
Moguls like Posner and 1980s Wall Street financiers Michael Milken and
Ivan Boesky have counterparts all over the world, including Europe.
While Europe's list of corporate raiders may be shorter than Wall
Street's, European moguls' abuses of power go back at least to the indus-
trial revolution, to Trollope's era in the mid-nineteenth century, 13 and
continue up to today.
One example from the late 1980s is the ultimately unsuccessful at-
tempt of Spain's "Albertos" (cousins Alberto Cortina and Alberto Al-
cocer) to parlay the fortune of their then-wives Alicia and Esther
Koplowitz into the creation of Spain's largest bank, through a merger of
Banco Central and Banesto, over the objections of the Koplowitzes' ben-
10 Books analyzing and decrying corporate overreaching were in vogue in the U.S. in the early
1990s. See, eg., M. LEWIS, supra note 9; R.A.G. MONKS & N. MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTA-
BILrrY (1991); J. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991).
11 R.A.G. MONKS & N. MINOW, supra note 10, at dust jacket.
12 See, eg., M. LEWIs, supra note 9; J. STEWART, supra note 10.
13 A. TROLLOPE, THE WAY WE LIVE Now (1875) is a British novel centering on the rise and
fall of a Boesky-like London arbitrageur of obscure origins named Augustus Melmotte, Esq.
Melmotte was "directo[r]" of "three dozen companies," and he "could make or mar any company
by buying or selling stock, and could make money dear or cheap as he pleased." A. TROLLOPE,
supra, at vol. I p. 31 (Oxford ed. 1941). This author has, elsewhere, examined in detail several real-
life incidents of nineteenth century - and even eighteenth century - British business overreaching,
albeit on a smaller scale than Trollope's Augustus Melmotte tragedy. Dowling, A Contract Theory
for a Complex Tort: Limiting Interference with Contract Beyond the Unlawful Means Test, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 487, 493-501 (1986), reprinted in 35 DEFENSE L.J. 503, 510-519 (1986). On Eu-
rope's need for efficient takeover legislation protecting minority shareholdersin this modem day of
increasing European takeovers, see Takeovers d la Carte, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 1992, at 11.
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efactor.14 (The Albertos' dreams ended abruptly after the press caught
Cortina in Vienna carrying on an affair with Spanish socialite Marta
Chavarri; the ensuing media uproar frightened off the Albertos' financial
backers, the Kuwait Investment Office.))
An even more recent example of a European corporate power strug-
gle is the 1990 fight between Carlo de Benedetti, Chairman of Ing. C.
Olivetti & Co. S.p.A., and television magnate Silvio Berlusconi. The two
Italians fought long and hard for rights to the voting stock of Italian
publishing giant Mondadori Editore S.p.A. 16 (De Benedetti and Berlus-
coni devoted so much effort to their feud and its court battles and arbi-
trations that they diverted themselves from their mutual interest in
promoting a harmonious single European market. 17)
Obviously the legal systems in both the European states and in the
United States have been unsuccessful in reining in all excesses of the ex-
ercise of corporate control. But these legal systems certainly do try. The
laws of both Europe and the United States contain sophisticated regula-
tions, such as insider trading controls, expressly designed to check abuses
of corporate power. The problem, of course, is that most who set out to
control a corporation attempt affirmatively to use the applicable laws of
corporate governance to further their own ends (or at least try to achieve
control by operating within these laws). For this reason, free market
legal systems face a tough problem trying to control abuses of corporate
power while still adhering to laissez-faire principles.
One way for any legal system to improve how it regulates a problem
is to study how other legal systems deal with the same issues, and adopt
the most successful solutions.' "The idea that no one nation has a mo-
nopoly of wisdom applies just as strongly to law as it does to any other
field of human endeavour."' 19 Perhaps by studying how the various Eu-
ropean states control corporate overreaching, the United States and its
states, or any one European state, could improve their regimes for regn-
14 See Kandell, Family Affairs: The Personal Lives of Business Titans Transfix a "New" Spain,
Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1989, at 1, col. 1. The "Albertos' "financial dealings received heavy coverage in
the Spanish press, including in the popular ilHolal magazine.
15 Id. at A8, col. 3.
16 See Revin, Italian Tycoons Push European Unity, Then War Over Home Turf, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 3, 1990, at Al, col. 6. Elsewhere, this author has examined other corporate power issues, in the
Italian context. Dowling, "L'Europa Sociale" 1 punto di vista delle imprese multinazionali USA,
INDUSTRIA E SINDACATO (Italy), June 28-July 5, 1991, at 16.
17 Id. at A16, col. 1.
18 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH iX-X, 1-4 (R. Drury & P. Xuereb
eds. 1991) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS].




Any discussion of "European law" in the 1990s must address the
interplay between the supranational laws (or instruments) of the Euro-
pean Community (EC) and the national laws of the individual EC mem-
ber states.2 1 Under EC jurisprudence, existing EC instruments have
"primacy" over member states' law.22 But, under the so-called principle
of "subsidiarity, ' 21 the EC actively attempts to defer to the member
states by not regulating those areas in which the member states are most
competent to govern by themselves.24
"EC law" in the early 1990s has a strong gravitational pull. Its
political and social importance is increasing at the direct expense of
member state law. Yet most laws which regulate day-to-day life within
Europe are still the laws of the member states themselves.2 5 Many basic
substantive areas of European law - including criminal law, personal
injury law, and contract law - remain, in the early 1990s, purely crea-
tures of member state law.26
But not all substantive areas of EC law neatly fit into the "member-
state-law-versus-EC-law" dichotomy. Several areas of European law are
in transition between having been regulated by the member states and
20 Such an exercise might be especially useful in the United States. If U.S. social critics are right,
and abuses of corporate power are grosser stateside than they are anywhere else, perhaps the legal
systems of the U.S. have the most to learn by example. Europe does not seem to have spawned quite
as many "corporate raiders" as has the U.S.; this may at least partially be because Europe's laws of
corporate governance work better than the analogous U.S. corporate laws.
21 An explanation of the balance between EC law and member state law is beyond the scope of
this article. This author has addressed this topic elsewhere, in Dowling, Worker Rights in the Post-
1992 European Communitiev What "'Social Europe" Means to United States-Based Multinational
Employers, 11 Nw. J. INTL L. & Bus. 564, 574-80, 590-94 (1991).
22 See Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty), arts. 189-92.
23 See Dowling, supra note 21, at 589 n.154.
24 Id. The topic of "European law" has effectively meant "EC law" ever since the mid-1980s,
when Brussels issued the "White Paper" (which set out the blueprint for the post-1992 single Euro-
pean market) and the Single European Act (which made the "White Paper" program part of the EC
treaty). See id. at 577-80. Invoking the theory that a truly single market extends beyond customs
law and into many other areas (just as, in the U.S., "interstate commerce" extends into almost every
area the federal government wants to regulate), Brussels has, since the mid-1980s, actively usurped
power to regulate in many areas formerly left to the member states - including, for example, com-
petition law, public procurement, and the various laws regulating product standards.
25 The most common instrument, or form of law, which Brussels uses is the directive. A direc-
tive is not directly applicable within the member states; the member states must implement it under
their own national law. Treaty, supra note 22, at art. 189. Thus, much EC law ultimately becomes
member state law. This article uses the phrase "EC law" as including member state laws which
implement EC instruments.
26 The EC did, however, make substantial inroads toward usurping other areas which had been
regulated by the member states, at the December 1991 Council meeting in Maastricht, the
Netherlands.
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becoming subjects of EC law. These are the areas where Brussels is ac-
tively stepping in to "harmonize," in order to create a single European
market for goods and services. One such transitionary topic is social, or
employment, law. Employment law in Europe remains almost wholly a
creature of member states' laws, but it is increasingly the subject of EC
proposals which would "harmonize" these laws.27 Another example -
one which is farther down the road to pervasive EC control - is Euro-
pean company law.28
Europe's company laws, particularly those affecting corporations
operating within a single member state, still exist almost exclusively at
the member state level. Yet Brussels is giving the member states some
competition, proposing instruments to "harmonize" these laws. Begin-
ning in 1968, the EC Council has been issuing some instruments regulat-
ing company law within the member states.2 9
As one key example, a recent directive creates a unique business
entity, the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), under which
two or more businesses founded under the laws of the member states (or
even member state citizens) can link up across member state lines, creat-
ing a discrete business entity with an EC-created legal identity, which
must pass any profits down to its members.30 And the EC Commission31
has gone farther, proposing an EC-level corporate form for which no
federal U.S. counterpart exists: The European corporation.32 Over the
27 See, eg., Dowling, supra note 21. This author has elsewhere discussed the groundbreaking
social law developments at the December 1991 Maastricht Council meeting, in which the Council
decided to create a "social continental Europe." Dowling, Employment Matters and the Social
Charter, in EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: AN OVERVIEW FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMU-
NITy (1992) (forthcoming, Kluwer Publishers).
28 The EC treaty explicitly requires the EC Commission and Council to "coordinat[e]" the
member states' "safeguards... for the protection of the interests... of companies or firms." Treaty,
supra note 22, at art. 54(3)(g). On the linguistic difference between "company" law and "corporate"
law, see F.H. BUCKLEY, CORPORATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 149 (2d ed. 1988) ("the Eng-
lish use the word 'company' where North Americans use the word 'corporation' ").
29 Directive No. 68/151/EEC (Mar. 9, 1968). See discussion infra accompanying note 55.
30 Regulation No. 2137/85/EEC (July 25, 1985) (effective July 1, 1989). For a discussion of the
EEIG regulation, which includes the regulation's full text, see Murphy, The European Economic
Interest Group [sic] (EEIG): A New European Business Entity, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65
(1990). See also EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPINGS: THE EEC REGULATION AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (D. van Gerven & C.
Aalders eds. 1990); F. WOOLDRIDGE, COMPANY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY 103-17 (1991); de Bryucker, EC Company Law - The European Company v.
The European Economic Interest Grouping and the Harmonization of National Company Laws, 21
GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 191 (1991).
31 The Commission is loosely similar to the U.S. Executive branch; it proposes laws which the
EC Council of Ministers approves or rejects. Treaty, supra note 22, at arts. 155-63 (explaining
Commission's role); id. at arts. 145-54 (explaining Council's role).
32 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, COM(89)268
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years, the Commission has repeatedly proposed a "European company
statute," attempting to make the European company format available as
an optional corporate form for businesses operating across member state
lines.33 The theory is that for a European-based multinational to incor-
porate once, at the EC level, would obviate the need for separate incorpo-
rations in each of the member states. (So far no "European company
statute" has become EC law because Brussels has insisted on adding -
as a "rider" burden to the benefit of EC-wide incorporation - a duty of
worker consultation and participation. European business has, to date,
successfully resisted.34) A similar company law proposal pending in the
early 1990s, one with a better chance of getting passed, would require
large enterprises operating in more than one member state to create
"works-councils" for employees, mandating a voice for labor in
management.35
European Company Laws: A Comparative Approach 36 is a compila-
tion of ten essays by various authors on the jurisprudence of corporate
control within Europe. The book focuses on the company laws within
the various member states, somewhat to the exclusion of the emerging
EC-level corporate laws.37 Yet while European Company Laws concerns
final SYN 218 (Aug. 25, 1989); Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(g)
of the EEC Treaty Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and
Obligations of Their Organs, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 240) (Sept. 9, 1983); see Proposal for a
Council Directive Complementing the Statute for a European Company with Regard to the Involve-
ment of Employees in the European Company, COM(89)268 final SYN 219 (Aug. 25, 1989). For a
collection of the adopted company law instruments through 1990, and for citations to the case law
construing these instruments, see EUROPEAN INFORMATION SERVICES, COMPENDIUM OF EC COM-
PANY LAW 9-229, 371-75 (1990).
33 See supra note 32.
34 See Dowling, supra note 21, at 607-08.
35 Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Establishment of a European Works Coun-
cil in Community-Scale Undertakings or Groups of Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and
Consulting Employees, COM (91)345 final (Sept. 16, 1991).
36 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS, supra note 18.
37 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS, supra note 18, does address certain key EC law instruments,
and it also addresses the laws of some non-EC European countries. Apparently the book's editors
perceive a treatment of EC law per se as a separate topic worthy of a wholly separate work: EURO-
PEAN COMPANY LAWS co-editor Peter G. Xuereb is scheduled to author a book called THE HAR-
MONIZATION OF COMPANY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, in 1993. (Xuereb's manuscript
is due in September 1992. His forthcoming book will be published by the publisher of EUROPEAN
COMPANY LAWS, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited.) For discussions already in print on
EC company law harmonization, see, e.g., C. & L. BELMONT, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW (1989);
E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW (1971); REGULATING CORPORATE
GROUPS IN EUROPE (D. Sugarman & G. Teubner eds. 1990); F. WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 30; Brad-
ley, 1992: The Case of Financial Services, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 124, 140 (1991); Conard, The
European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporation Laws, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2150 (1991); Note, Fed-
eralism and Company Law: A "Race to the Bottom" in the European Community, 79 GEO. L. J. 1581
(1991). For black-letter summaries of the company laws internal to the member states, see, e.g.,
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itself with member states' internal company laws, the book's goal is
much loftier than merely compiling the European states' corporate stat-
utes into some sort of practitioners' guide. Rather, European Company
Laws attempts to divine jurisprudential truths about the regulation of
power within the European company by examining the European com-
pany from different substantive law perspectives. Each of the book's nine
substantive chapters takes a different approach toward the same destina-
tion: Divining the nature of control within the European enterprise.
As an investigation into the sources of power within the European
company, European Company Laws works best when it steps back and
takes a general perspective, examining the forest of issues instead of
dwelling on individual trees. Some (but unfortunately by no means all)
of the book's chapters take an approach broad enough to advance the
book's goal of adding something to the study of control within the Euro-
pean corporation. A prime example is the first chapter, "The Nature of
the Company," by French law professor Jean Paillusseau.38
Paillusseau takes the broadest possible approach, investigating the
most basic concept imaginable in the comparative company law area -
the identity issue, or what a European company is. Paillusseau, like
Descartes, begins by assuming nothing about his subject, simply looking
around and describing what he perceives.39 In doing so, Paillusseau iso-
lates three competing theories of the European corporation. These theo-
ries focus on: One, whether the European corporation is essentially a
creature of contract (the old "contract theory," by which a European
state's legal system views its corporations as contracts among two or
more founders); two, whether the European corporation is a creature of a
legislative act (the "institution theory," by which a European state views
its corporations as products of the statutes under which they are incorpo-
rated); and three, whether the European corporation is most properly
understood as a complex social "enterprise" transcending corporate
form. This third, quasi-sociological theory holds that today's publicly-
traded multinational is a complex social entity whose legal structure is
subordinate to other aspects of its legal identity - including its contrac-
BREBNER & CO., SETTING UP A COMPANY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COUNTRY BY
COUNTRY GUIDE (1989); S.N. FROMMEL & J.H. THOMPSON, COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE (1975).
38 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS, supra note 18, at 19-40.
39 Descartes began his Meditations (1642) by rejecting everything he knew, constructing a phi-
losophy by compiling what he could perceive afresh. DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOS-
OPHY (2d ed. 1642), reprinted in DESCARTES, DESCARTES PHILOSOPHICAL WRITNGS 59-150, at 61-
62 (1954). This author has, elsewhere, discussed Descartes in the legal context of a "hypothesis-
forming" approach. Dowling, General Propositions and Concrete Cases: The Search for a Standard
in the Conflict Between Individual Property Rights and the Social Interest, I J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 353, 357 n.30 (1985).
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tual obligations, its titles to property, the substantive regulations (such as
environmental and labor laws) which control it, and its internal laws
such as its bylaws and articles.
Paillusseau ends up elevating this final theory, the "enterprise the-
ory," over the other two. In this, Paillusseau is not alone; three other
chapters in European Company Laws - the introduction and the two
substantive chapters written by co-editor Peter G. Xuereb - likewise
champion the "enterprise theory."'  Ultimately, in fact, this book's
greatest contribution to company law jurisprudence is the persuasiveness
of its argument for the "enterprise theory."
The "enterprise theory" recognizes that a multinational business'
form of corporate organization is only one aspect of its legal identity.
Form of organization alone does not define the organization. When a
multinational business is incorporated separately under various coun-
tries' laws, its status under any one single country's laws - even the laws
of its home-office country - do not adequately define the business, le-
gally. For example, Abbott Laboratories is a U.S.-based multinational
drug manufacturer, incorporated as an Illinois corporation.41 But each
of what Abbott considers the "international subsidiaries" of its "Abbott
International Ltd." subsidiary has an independent legal identity. One of
these sub-subsidiaries, "Abbott Laboratories Argentina SA," has been a
free-standing Argentine corporation in the eyes of the Argentine govern-
ment since 1937.42 While the stock of "Abbott Laboratories Argentina
SA" is held by "Abbott International Ltd.", "Abbott Laboratories Ar-
gentina SA" is no less an Argentine corporation than is, for example, the
Argentine multinational conglomerate Bunge y Born. That an Illinois
corporation ultimately owns "Abbott Laboratories Argentina SA" does
not alter the Argentine subsidiary corporation's rights and obligations
under Argentine law.
Thus, to consider Abbott Laboratories' legal identity merely as a
function of Illinois law is to miss a big part of the picture, because it
ignores all the rights and obligations of Abbott's many subsidiaries
outside the United States (Abbott Laboratories made 35% of its 1989
sales outside the United States43). Further, Abbott is "licensed to do
business" in states in which it has no incorporated subsidiary, and it
might be a partner in separately-incorporated joint ventures in still other
40 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS, supra note 18, at 1-17, 141-208.
41 ABBOTT LABORATORIES, 1989 Annual Report 32 (1990).
42 See, eg., AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN ARGENTINA, AMERICAN BUSINESS IN
ARGENTINA 1987/88 DIRECTORY 51 (1987).
43 ABBOTT LABORATORIES, supra note 41, at 19.
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states. Anyone trying to define "Abbott Laboratories" from a legal per-
spective would have to take into account all the laws controlling all these
licensures and ventures.
A proponent of the "enterprise theory" would also argue that even
the sum of all these jurisdictions' corporate laws alone does not define
what "Abbott Laboratories" is legally. This is because non-corporate
laws - including contract, labor, financial, and bankruptcy laws - also
control Abbott's fundamental rights and obligations everywhere it oper-
ates. This says nothing of "laws" internal to Abbott itself, such as its
articles, its bylaws, and even its employee handbooks.
The "enterprise theory" of the corporation insists that a publicly-
traded multinational business like Abbott Laboratories is more than
whatever the Illinois Secretary of State would ever say it is: Under the
"enterprise theory," a multinational enterprise like Abbott Laboratories
is a product of all the laws, bylaws, contracts, and relationships which
control it. Returning to the example of DWG Corporation, the "enter-
prise theory" might offer some new strategies to the minority stockhold-
ers battling Victor Posner. Realizing that the corporate laws and bylaws
under which Posner invokes his power are stacked in Posner's favor, per-
haps these minority stockholders could, rather than complain helplessly
at stockholders' meetings, seek out doctrines from other areas of the law
- such as securities regulations, racketeering, or even criminal law -
which might impose viable restrictions on their nemesis.
The "enterprise theory" as a concept is probably even more practi-
cal for corporations based in Europe than it is for those like Abbott
which are based in the United States, simply because of the existence of
the EC and its emerging single market. While the United States in the-
ory contains more than fifty jurisdictions each with the power to create
corporations, in practice the U.S. states' jurisdictions peaceably interre-
late, via the concepts of "state of incorporation," "principal place of busi-
ness," and "licensure to do business." A business incorporated in one
U.S. state never has to incorporate in any other state in order to do ex-
tensive business nationwide; thus, U.S. law does not give rise to the com-
pany law quagmires present in Europe.'
Historically the EC member states were fiercely independent coun-
tries. Lacking the corporate comity which exists among U.S. states, the
EC member states' legal systems have viewed entities incorporated else-
44 On the diverse legal problems besetting European multinationals, see ZJ. CHUBBIN & P.
GEROSKI, EUROPEAN CONGLOMERATE FIRMS: A REPORT (1990) (Commission of the European




where in Europe as wholly foreign. To this day, the status of a Portu-
guese company operating in Spain is much more akin to the status of a
Brazilian company operating in Chile than it is to the status of a Rhode
Island company operating in Texas. Of course, a central goal of the EC
single market is to change this, to give the Portuguese company access to
Spain like that which the Rhode Island company enjoys in Texas.
While all European corporations are still incorporated under a sin-
gle member state's laws (no "European company statute" yet exists45),
European businesses are increasingly finding themselves subject to legal
forces from outside their home states of incorporation - be they EC
instruments or laws of foreign jurisdictions. For example, a German cor-
poration which is a partner in a Greek joint venture and a Danish corpo-
ration which is a member of an EEIG with a British partnership each has
a legal identity larger than its mere corporate status within its home state
of incorporation. As EC law extends its tentacles deeper and deeper into
the member states, and as European enterprises come to do more and
more business across member state lines, the "enterprise theory" will
eventually become the only viable way to determine the legal rights and
obligations, and the only way to isolate the legal identity, of corporations
within Europe.
Because the "enterprise theory" is becoming the only accurate way
to conceive of the pan-European multinational, European Company
Laws' advancement of this theory makes the book an important contribu-
tion to European company law jurisprudence. Yet while the book's chief
strength is its explication of the "enterprise theory," the book's chief
weakness is the inconsistent, sporadic way in which the work advances
this theory. To give the book more focus, and to improve its usefulness,
the editors should have required all the contributors to examine their
topics through the lens of a believer in the "enterprise theory." As it is,
most of the book's authors seem never even to have heard of the "enter-
prise theory,"46 and two of the book's chapters which promise to apply
the theory in specific substantive law contexts fail to do so.47
These are the two chapters by the book's co-editor, University of
London law professor Peter Xuereb.48 Judging from the book's effective
45 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
46 The "enterprise theory" is only discussed in four chapters. See supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text.
47 Chapter 7 ("Shareholder Rights, the Interests of the Enterprise and 'Reasonable Necessity' -
A Comparative Review of French, Italian, and English Law"); and Chapter 8 ("An 'Enterprise
Theory' of Company Law and Judicial Control over the Exercise of General Meeting Power - A
Comparative Review"), in EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS, supra note 18, at 141-208.
48 See supra note 47.
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introductory chapter (which Xuereb co-wrote) and from the titles of
these two chapters,49 Xuereb is on record as a true believer in the "enter-
prise theory." Yet Xuereb never fully articulates the "enterprise theory,"
and he certainly never applies it successfully. The book's revelatory ex-
plication of the theory is in the Paillusseau chapter.5 0
While the book fails to exploit editor Xuereb's own implicit promise
to develop the "enterprise theory" fully, some of the chapters which do
not even mention the theory do end up making important contributions
to other aspects of the jurisprudence of the European company. Gener-
ally, these chapters are those which, like the Paillusseau chapter, take a
broad approach. One such chapter -the most fascinating in the book -
is Italian law professor Francesco Galgano's exegesis on the war for
power waged within the European company."1 Galgano describes all the
armies which fight the battles for control of a corporation: He examines
the potentially simultaneous struggles for control between shareholders
and directors, between shareholders and management, and between ma-
jority owners and parent minority owners exercising power through the
so-called "telescopic effect."52 Most interestingly of all, Galgano also ex-
plores the fights for corporate power among shareholders, directors, and
employees within the unique European institution of worker consultation
and participation, or "co-determination."5 3
Another chapter which hits the mark by taking a sufficiently broad
approach, and which likewise makes a real contribution to the jurispru-
dence of the European company, is co-editor Robert Drury's final chap-
ter exploring the "Nullity of Companies."5 4 The topic of corporate
"nullity" may seem to be an arcane, little-used backwater of black-letter
company law. But Drury proves otherwise, milking the "nullity" con-
cept for its fullest jurisprudential possibilities by taking an almost Dada-
istic approach to define what the European company is by exploring
what it is not - what renders it null. Drury opens by explaining the
EC's first-ever directive in the company law area, the 1968 "First Direc-
49 Id.
50 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
51 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS, supra note 18, at 85-101 ("The Allocation of Power and the
Public Company in Europe").
52 Id. Galgano describes the "telescopic effect" by example:
If Company A holds 100 per cent of the capital of Company B, which in turn holds 51 per cent
of that in Company C, which in turn holds 51 per cent of that in Company D, then Company A
will be in a position to dominate, through Companies B and C, the general meeting of Company
D even though in terms of equity its participation in Company D amounts only to 26.01 per
cent.
Id. at 92.
53 Id. at 92-97.
54 Id. at 247-78.
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tive" on nullity of companies.5" This instrument attempts to harmonize
EC member states' laws on nullity only very loosely, giving member
states a list of possible corporate illegalities from which they can choose
to decide which specific wrongs each state will not tolerate, rendering its
offenders null.
56
Drury eloquently57 demonstrates that vast differences still exist
among the EC member states' philosophies toward the corporation.
Notwithstanding the 1968 directive, the grounds which are sufficiently
objectionable to nullify a corporation still differ widely among the mem-
ber states. For example, Britain recognizes only two wrongs which will
render a company null, and one of these is so obscure as to be useless. A
British company can be held null only if it was formed for an illegal
purpose or if it is a trade union." Not surprisingly, British law rarely
invokes the nullity concept; "only one" British case in the recent past has
involved nullity.19 But other EC states differ radically. Italy, for exam-
ple, is a nullity police state. The Italians recognize eight grounds for
declaring nullity (each recognized in the 1968 directive), including such
technical reasons as failure to have articles of association publicly "stipu-
lated" and failure to include in the articles the corporation's name, ob-
ject, or amount of capital subscribed. 6°
As Drury demonstrates, the extreme differences among the legal vi-
olations which various member states consider sufficiently egregious to
merit nullifying a company say quite a bit about what the European
states consider most important about their corporation laws. Even more
basically, the fact of these differences points out that real, fundamental
differences still exist not only among the substantive corporate laws in
the EC member states, but also among the value systems which underlie
the states' individual corporate laws.
The Drury chapter - like the Galgano chapter on power, the Pail-
lusseau chapter on the "enterprise theory," and the book's introduction
- succeeds because it dares to view the jurisprudential "big picture."
Apart from these four contributions, however, only one other chapter in
the book steps back to take the broad approach: Spanish law professor
Angel Rojo's contribution on "The Typology of Companies." 61 How-
ever, where the broad approach benefitted the other four chapters by al-
55 Directive No. 68/151/EEC (Mar. 9, 1968).
56 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS, supra note 18, at 250-53.
57 Drury's chapter is the most well written section of the book.
58 Id. at 271.
59 Id. at 274. German and Dutch law also take a narrow view of nullity.
60 Id. at 266, 268. French and Greek law also take a broad view of nullity.
61 Id. at 41-59.
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lowing them to draw basic jurisprudential conclusions which would not
have been apparent had their scope been too narrow, the broad approach
has a contrary effect on Rojo's piece. This broad approach allows him to
obfuscate what otherwise would have been salient insights.
Rojo's "The Typology of Companies" is turgidly written and his
ideas fail to penetrate the opaque fog of prose like: "[A] duality of mod-
els is the consequence of a predetermined legislative typological op-
tion."62 And the longer Rojo's sentences get, the less they say. For
example:
Due to a certain lack of sufficient analysis, there has been a tendency to
treat as equivalent the various legal regimes for the SA or, which is even
more dangerous, there has been an endeavour to extend completely or par-
tially the legislative regime of the Aktiengesellschaft63 (which is considered
to be technically superior) to the other legal regimes which allow the SA
form to be functionally poly-valent, thereby restricting this poly-valency
without addressing on precise criteria the underlying typological
questions.
64
Besides the Rojo chapter and the other four "broad approach"
pieces, each of the rest of the contributions in European Company Laws,
unfortunately, takes too narrow a focus to meaningfully advance the
book's search for the legal balance of power within the European corpo-
ration. These other chapters all take a strict "black-letter" approach,
ultimately degenerating into mini-treatises simply listing how selected
European states have historically legislated on various substantive
problems of company law. Moreover, these topics are too arbitrary, and
their treatments too selective, for these black-letter chapters to serve as
useful practitioners' guides.
For example, German law professor Eddy Wymeersch's contribu-
tion65 examines how member states' regulation of securities markets af-
fects European company law. Yet Wymeersch takes the easy way out,
merely listing the most basic securities laws within the member states,
offering no real analysis to explain the jurisprudential significance of the
differences among these laws. Another cop-out is British law professor
Frank Wooldridge's chapter on, simply, "Aspects of the Regulation of
Groups of Companies in European Laws."' 66 Wooldridge does no more
62 Id. at 42.
63 Although Rojo never says so, for the benefit of the European company law novice, Aktien-
gesellschaft (or AG) is the German public company, as contrasted with Germany's private company,
the much more common Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter Haftung (or GmbH).
64 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS, supra note 18, at 46.
65 Id. at 61-83 ("The Effects of the Regulation of Securities Markets on Company Law Within
the EEC").
66 Id. at 103-39.
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than what his title implies: He lists selected European laws regulating
groups of companies. Similar is the piece by British professor Robert R.
Pennington, on how finance regulation affects European company law.67
Pennington's chapter, although harmless, really would be useful only as
an overview for someone wanting to know a little bit about corporate
finance in England, France, and Germany. Like the Wymeersch and
Wooldridge chapters, it adds nothing to the subject of European com-
pany law jurisprudence. Most disappointing of all are the two contribu-
tions by co-editor Xuereb, which - contrary to their titles' promises to
explicate the "enterprise theory" in context6" - turn out to be nothing
more than black-letter law summaries a la Wymeersch, Wooldridge, and
Pennington.69
The goal of European Company Laws is not to provide the interna-
tional law practitioner with a black-letter guide to company laws in the
various European states. The book sets out to dig deeper, attempting to
mine the jurisprudential bases of European company law for insights into
how different European states use different jurisprudential approaches to
regulate power within the corporation, and for insights into what these
differences might mean to the transnational European enterprise. The
book's editors propose that by studying these differences, any one Euro-
pean state might find fresh ideas for improving its internal company laws
to better regulate excesses of corporate power.70 To the book's editors,
sound legal development lies in cross-breeding among different legal gene
pools. When the book succeeds in its goal - as it does in its introduc-
tory chapter and in its contributions by Paillusseau, Galgano, and Drury
- European Company Laws adds substantially to the jurisprudence of
the corporate form in the international context, offering concrete teach-
ings to states wrestling with how best to regulate corporate control.
These four chapters successfully contrast alternate legal solutions to sim-
ilar problems of corporate power, including the viability of the increas-
ingly important "enterprise theory." Unfortunately, when the book fails
in its stated goal - as it does in its six other chapters - the work adds
little to the jurisprudence of the European company, and it makes far
67 Id. at 209-46 ("The Financing of Current Transactions by Companies under English, French,
and German Law").
68 See supra note 47.
69 In fact, in his two chapters Xuereb gets so far away from his promised "enterprise theory"
approach that he actually perverts the very concept of the "enterprise" itself: At one point, Xuereb
uses the word "enterprise" in a way directly inconsistent with the "enterprise theory" concept.
However, Xuereb acknowledges this inconsistency in a footnote. EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS,
supra note 18, at 190, 205 n.125 ("[t]he word 'enterprise' is used in the sense of the company as a
going concern").
70 Id. at ix-x, 1-4.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 12:601(1992)
more tedious reading.
71
The lessons which European Company Laws's four successful chap-
ters teach apply broadly, well beyond western Europe. In the United
States, courts continue to process corporate control disputes, including
the Victor Posner debacle7z and other conflicts arising out of what social
critics call the "corporate greed" of the "go-go 1980s."' 7 According to
these critics, U.S. jurisdictions apparently have much to learn about how
to regulate corporate control. The way the United States has regulated
in this area up to now has not resolved what these critics insist is the
problem. In re-assessing its laws regulating the control of corporations,
perhaps the United States could learn something from Europe, which
managed to weather the 1980s with fewer socially unpopular cases of
corporate abuse. After all, both culturally and jurisprudentially, the
United States is not too different from Europe. Perhaps some of the prin-
ciples which more successfully regulate corporate control in Europe
could work as well in the United States.
And turning from the west to the east, the nascent market econo-
mies of eastern Europe appear to have even more fundamental lessons to
learn from how western Europe regulates corporate power.74 As the
eastern European countries, especially those with an eye on future EC
membership, struggle to create workable private ownership of state-
owned means of production, eastern Europe cannot ignore the exper-
iences of the west. While the western world has uniformly heralded capi-
talism's arrival in eastern Europe as a positive benefit for everyone, the
advent of free markets in the east, to many, also means the introduction
of a social evil, the "greed" manifested in abuses of corporate power. As
Eastern Europe designs workable and politically-acceptable systems by
which private enterprises can efficiently produce goods and services and
employ people, the eastern European legal systems are necessarily going
to have to regulate power within private enterprises. In doing so, these
71 With the exception of the Rojo chapter, these other chapters are essentially overviews of the
black-letter European law on their various topics. To summarize black-letter European company
law, however, is not one of this book's stated goals. And, of course, straight black-letter law summa-
ries tend to make tough reading. These chapters are no exception.
72 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
74 Eastern Europeans themselves, having taken the teachings of Karl Marx so seriously for so
many years, must fear the prospect of "corporate greed" entering their societies along with free
markets. While Marx never used so faddish a term as "corporate greed," he did decry private own-
ership of capital in part because "[tihe concept of capital contains the capitalist." K. MARx, THE
GRUNDRISSE § E (final sentence) (1858), reprinted in K. MARx & F. ENGELS, THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 221, 276 (R.C. Tucker 2d ed. 1978).
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countries will have to confront directly all the corporate control issues
central to European Company Laws.

